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Abstract 
The ability to process and incorporate temporal information into behaviour is necessary 
for functioning in our environment.  While previous research has extended adults’ temporal 
processing capacity onto infants, little research has examined young infants’ capacity to 
incorporate temporal information into their behaviours.  The present study examined 3- and 6-
month-old infants’ ability to process temporal durations of 700 and 1200 milliseconds by means 
of an eye tracking cueing task.  If 3- and 6-month-old infants can discriminate centrally-
presented temporal cues, then they should be able to correctly make anticipatory eye movements 
to the location of succeeding targets at a rate above chance.  The results indicated that 6-, but not 
3-month-old infants were able to successfully discriminate and incorporate temporal information 
into their visual expectations of predictable temporal events.  Brain maturation and the 
emergence of functional significance for processing temporal events on the scale of hundreds of 
milliseconds may account for these findings. 
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The Development of Infants’ Expectations for Event Timing 
The perception of time is a capacity necessary for functioning in our environment.  For 
example, the information one gains from detecting the passage of time is a necessary component 
of speech production and comprehension (Rosen, 1992; Poeppel, 2003; Van Wassenhove, Grant, 
& Poeppel, 2007), reasoning (Van Beek, 1992), episodic memory (Tulving, 2002), goal planning 
(Janicik & Bartel, 2003), and expecting future events (Caruso, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2008).  
Although research has suggested adults have the capacity to detect, process, and modulate 
behavior on the basis of the temporal parameters of events (Jones, Rosenkranz, Rothwell, & 
Jahanshahi, 2004; Wild-Wall, Willemssen, & Falkenstein, 2009; Wittmann & Paulus, 2008), 
adults seem to lack a precise stopwatch-like mechanism (Hass & Herrmann, 2012).  
Nevertheless, the capacity to perceive the passage of time is functional in adults and extensively 
used by their cognitive processes.  As cognitive processes develop and become available to the 
individual, theoretically, so should the capacity to perceive the passage of time become more 
evident in support of those increasing cognitive processes (Lewkowicz, 1989; Rovee-Collier, 
1995).  In early infancy, consequently, the capacity to perceive time would facilitate the 
cognitive constructs that allow them to better understand their complex environment.  One 
particularly important cognitive construct that increases processing efficiency, even in infancy, is 
future oriented thinking that enables the allocation of resources prior to the occurrence of regular 
events (Haith, 1994).  If infants have the ability to process time, therefore, then they should be 
able to use time information when trying to make predictions about temporally predictable 
events in their environment.  The ability to understand and create expectations about temporally 
predictable events is important because it allows individuals to plan and prepare for the future 
occurrence of these events, so they can act optimally in their environment.     
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Time perception studies typically investigate an individual’s awareness of subjective 
time.  Subjective time can be thought of as the amount of physical time one believes they have 
experienced from the initiation to termination of a specific event.  The information about events 
one receives regarding their subjective time is important when planning for the future.  For 
example, students’ attitudes towards studying for an upcoming test will be different when they 
perceive themselves as having a little versus a lot of time to do so (Nussbaum, Liberman, & 
Trope, 2006).  While subjective time can theoretically be studied with respect to any magnitude 
of time (e.g., milliseconds, minutes, hours, etc.), researchers typically study subjective time 
perception with respect to a restricted range.   
Time perception studies typically involve the ability to judge, contrast, and produce 
events’ time durations or the time between events, which last from 500 milliseconds to a few 
minutes (Grondin, 2008; Zakay & Block, 1997).  The ability to perceive and process temporal 
events of small magnitude has led to the emergence of the idea that humans may possess a 
temporal cognitive mechanism similar to an internal clock (Church, 1984).  Since the internal 
clock is a mechanism that keeps track of the temporal parameter of events, subjective time is the 
temporal information one obtains from their internal clock.  
Internal Clock Theory 
One of the earliest, if not the earliest, bit of evidence in favour of an internal clock for 
processing time can be traced back to the work of Hudson Hoagland in the early 1930s.  
Hoagland (1933) noted that his wife would complain how slowly time passed as she was ill with 
a fever.  While recording her body temperature, Hoagland asked his wife to count to 60 seconds.  
He observed an inverse relationship between her body temperature and the time it took her to 
count to 60 seconds.  As her body temperature increased, the amount of physical time required 
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for her to subjectively experience 60 seconds decreased.  Hoagland concluded that the human 
body possesses a chemical clock that can either be sped up or slowed down by changes in 
temperature—similar to a chemical reaction.  The chemical clock, as Hoagland concluded, was 
what allows humans to perceive the passage of time. 
Around the same time of the assertion of humans possessing an internal, or chemical, 
clock was made, psychophysicists were trying to understand subjective timing in humans 
themselves.  The psychophysicists were particularly concerned with understanding subjective 
timing as a prospective, rather than retrospective, judgement.  Prospective time judgements 
involve tasks that require the participant to have a present awareness of time since the 
information is necessary for the completion of the task (Eisler, Eisler, & Hellström, 2008; Hicks, 
1992).  In contrast, retrospective time judgements involve judgements about time after the task is 
completed (e.g., “how long did it take you to complete that test?”).  So the time perception tasks 
being used required participants to discriminate, verbally estimate, produce, or reproduce the 
time values of viewed visual and auditory stimuli.  In discrimination tasks, participants were 
asked if a given stimulus had the same duration as a previously viewed stimulus (Henry, 1948).  
In verbal estimation studies, participants verbally stated for how long they believed a stimulus 
was displayed (Gilliland & Humphreys, 1943).  In tasks requiring production and reproduction, 
participants were asked to generate or mimic, respectively, a temporal event usually by tapping 
or pressing and holding a button down (Gilliland & Humphreys, 1943; Woodrow, 1930).  
Regardless of the type of task used, researchers observed a common pattern in the way humans 
process and subjectively perceive time. 
The pattern of results obtained from decades of psychophysical work on subjective 
timing was difficult to explain and interpret from a theoretical perspective.  When an individual 
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was asked to estimate how long a temporal event lasted, the variability in their replies increased 
as the temporal event’s duration increased.  When the variability associated to the replies was 
defined as a proportion relative to the magnitude of the estimated temporal event, however, the 
coefficient of the variability in the replies was relatively constant (Treisman, 1963).  
Furthermore, this pattern of results conformed to Weber’s Law (Laming, 1986)—the variation of 
estimation around a given mean is proportional to variation around other means of different 
magnitudes.  Such a pattern of results suggested a mechanism of constant sensitivity towards 
subjective timing in humans. 
To combine the idea of humans possessing a chemical clock with the psychophysical data 
on subjective timing in humans, Treisman (1963) theorized that Hoagland’s (1933) chemical 
clock could be thought of as an internal clock composed of three distinct stages that operate 
together.  The first stage is the pacemaker-accumulator center, in which arousal causes the 
pacemaker to emit pulses.  When arousal is constant, as in being exposed to a temporal event of a 
set magnitude, the pulses emitted by the center are emitted at a constant rate as well.  When an 
experienced event is over, the number of emitted pulses are tabulated by the accumulator and 
then stored into memory (i.e., the second component of the model).  The memory of the event 
can later be retrieved by the third component of the model, the comparator.  The comparator 
enables the individual to compare the number of pulses for a recently attended event with the 
number of pulses for a similar event represented in one’s memory, and determine if both events 
had similar temporal parameters or not (as indicated by the number of accumulated pulses).  
Since the pacemaker-accumulator must open and close to tabulate the number of pulses emitted 
during a given temporal event, temporal events with the same temporal duration may have a 
different total number of pulses attributed to it.  This is due to there being systematic variability 
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associated with how long it takes to open and close the pacemaker-accumulator.  As well, the 
degree of variability in opening and closing the pacemaker-accumulator increases for larger 
temporal parameters that are being measured by the internal clock.  Finally, Tresiman (1963) 
postulated that the memory residuals of past timed events may contain sources of error as the 
timed events may be remembered for occurring longer or less than what was actually 
experienced.  Together, the internal clock model provided a theoretical explanation as to how 
individuals process time and why subjective timing does not precisely encapsulate the amount of 
physical time of a specific event’s duration.  
Though Treisman’s (1963) theory advanced the idea of humans possessing an internal 
clock for processing and making judgements related to the temporal parameter of events, it did 
not create immense interest in human time perception as a field of study (Wearden, 2005).  
Interestingly enough, a theory quite similar to the internal clock theory emerged from a different 
area of scrutiny, animal learning behaviour (Allan, 1998).  This alternate theory proved to 
become the foundation for explaining subjective timing in animals and, subsequently, humans.      
Scalar Expectancy Theory  
Operant conditioning as a phenomenon and paradigm was first extrapolated through 
animal learning studies.  A typical operant conditioning experiment consisted of an animal (e.g., 
a rat) learning to perform a specific behaviour (e.g., push a lever downward) through the 
reinforcement of receiving a reward (e.g., a food pellet).  Typically, hundreds, or even thousands, 
of trials were required until the behavioural action was successfully learned.  Skinner (1990) 
designed a specific form of operant conditioning that released rewards to the animal on a fixed-
interval schedule.  Only behavioural actions emitted after a specific amount of time had elapsed 
were rewarded.  As a result, the animal learned to temporally regulate their responses such that 
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responses were emitted in higher proportion as the amount of elapsed time neared the onset of 
the reward being available (Dews, 1970; Ferster & Skinner, 1957; Lowe & Harzem, 1977; 
Schneider, 1969).  Along with the rat, animal species such as cats, birds, fish, and turtles have 
been observed to temporally regulate their actions (Lejeune & Wearden, 1991).  The ability of 
animals to temporally regulate their behaviours puzzled learning behaviourists as they could not 
theoretically explain the pattern of results through a mechanism like reward-based learning. 
 Eventually, through mounting consistent evidence, the initial inability for learning 
behaviourists to explain animals’ ability to temporally regulate their actions was replaced by the 
formation of Scalar Expectancy Theory (SET).  A closer look at the fixed-interval operant 
conditioning studies revealed that the temporally regulated behaviours of the animals conformed 
to Weber’s Law (Gibbon, 1977).  With evidence from multiple studies, most notably the work by 
Dews (1970) which investigated fixed-interval learning with pigeons, Gibbon (1977) concluded 
that animals possess a scalar timing mechanism that allows them to encode the temporal 
parameter of events.  Animals were able to recognize and encode the critical amount of time that 
had to elapse before their behaviour would be rewarded.  This was observed as:  (1) the animals 
increased the frequency of executing the learned behaviour as the elapsed time since their last 
reward increased and mounted closer to the magnitude of time that had to elapse before the 
learned behaviour could be rewarded again, (2) the animals were more accurate at executing the 
learned behaviour at the appropriate time for shorter reward schedules than longer ones, and (3) 
the likelihood of the animal performing the learned behaviour was a function of a ratio rather 
than an absolute difference between the onset of when the learned behaviour was executed and 
the magnitude of time that had to elapse before the learned behaviour could be rewarded again—
a property of Weber’s Law.  For example, the probability of a rat executing a learned behaviour 
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will be the same when 30 seconds has elapsed in a experimental condition where the rat is 
rewarded for executing the learned behaviour every 60 seconds, and when 60 seconds has 
elapsed in a experimental condition where the rat is rewarded for executing the learned 
behaviour every 120 seconds (LaBarbera & Church, 1974).  As an outcome of SET, researchers 
postulated that animals contain a non-random capacity that allows them to temporally regulate 
their behaviours.  An exact model of this temporal capacity was established a few years later 
(Gibbon, Church, & Meck, 1984).  
What is most notable about the SET model proposed by Gibbon, Church, and Meck 
(1984) is its resemblance to Treisman’s (1963) internal clock theory.  SET contains clock, 
memory, and decision processes that operate quite similarly to the components proposed by 
Treisman (1963).  Like internal clock theory’s pacemaker-accumulator, the pacemaker-switch—
the clock process of the SET model—offers a source of variability within the SET model that 
accounts for the scalar property (i.e., conformity to Weber’s Law) in animals’ capacity to 
temporally regulate their behaviour.  Similar to the explanation proposed by Treisman (1963), 
the pacemaker-switch tabulates the temporal parameter of an event by emitting and recording 
pulses throughout the duration of the event.  There is systematic variability associated with the 
speed of opening and closing of the pacemaker-switch.  The variability in the speed of opening 
and closing the pacemaker-switch increases for events with longer durations.  The variability 
associated with the opening and closing of the pacemaker-switch provides a mechanism for why 
subjective timing is not a perfectly precise approximation of physical time.  That said, however, 
the SET model does differ from internal clock theory by placing a greater emphasis on the 
memory process associated with the model.  Gibbon et al. (1984) postulated that the memory 
representations of events’ temporal parameter provide a source of the scalar variance in animal’s 
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capacity to process time information since the regular variability in the temporal component of 
representations for events increases as the magnitude of the event’s temporal parameter 
increases.  While SET and internal clock theory have some differences in the structure of their 
associated models and as to which component of the model provides the greatest source for the 
scalar property in animal’s capacity to process temporal information, the theories are remarkably 
similar.  Perhaps what distinguishes SET and internal clock theory the most is not the theories 
themselves, rather their field of origin and application (Wearden, 2005).  While both theories 
promoted the notion of the existence of an internal clock, SET became the dominant theory in 
the study of time perception.     
As SET explained temporally regulated behaviours in animal learning studies, 
researchers began to investigate if SET could explain time perception in adults as well.  Wearden 
and McShane (1988) provided one of the earliest accounts of SET being applied to adults on a 
time production task.  Participants were asked to produce temporal events that mimicked a 
temporal parameter that ranged between 500 and 1300 milliseconds in duration.  Results from 
the study indicated that adults were able to produce temporal events that centered the temporal 
parameter they were supposed to mimic.  As well, the variability of the produced temporal 
events increased as the temporal parameter that was to be mimicked increased in magnitude.  
The real interesting finding, however was that the variability of the produced temporal events for 
each temporal parameter that was mimicked was proportional to one another—the hallmark of 
SET.  Furthermore, the non-random pattern of results could not be explained by participants 
relying on chronometric counting (i.e., the ability to explicitly “count-out” how much time has 
elapsed) since the studied durations were too short to do so (Zeiler, Scott, & Hoyert, 1987).  The 
conclusion drawn from the results suggested the presence of an involuntary internal time-keeping 
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mechanism.  As SET provided a possible theoretical foundation for the results of Wearden and 
McShane (1988) in addressing their findings of subjective timing in adults, methods similar to 
those used in animal studies were developed for further adult testing. 
Two commonly used tasks for measuring temporal processing in animals are temporal 
generalization and temporal bisection.  In temporal generalization, the animal (e.g., rat) learns 
through reward to press a lever when a light is turned on for a standard duration (e.g., 4 seconds) 
(Church & Gibbon, 1982).  Once the animal successfully learns to temporally regulate their 
behaviour so they only execute the learned behaviour when they are exposed to the standard 
duration, the test phase of the experiment begins.  In the test phase, the light is turned on for an 
amount of time that is either the same, greater, or smaller than the standard duration by a fixed, 
linear value (e.g., 0.8 seconds).  For trials where the light was turned on for an amount of time 
that was unequal to the learned standard duration, the animal is not rewarded for pressing the 
lever.  The animal, therefore, is motivated to only press the lever when exposed to the standard 
duration.  The researcher then records the proportion of lever presses made by the animal when 
exposed to the standard and non-standard time durations.  The results from such a task reveal the 
animal’s decision-making criteria when determining if two durations are equal in magnitude or 
not.  This is evident as the proportion of lever presses is highest for when the animal was 
exposed to the standard duration, and then decreases as the degree of separation in magnitude 
increases between the standard duration and the non-standard durations used in the experiment. 
The effectiveness of this task for exposing the decision-making behind animal time judgements 
led to the development of a variant for human testing (Wearden, 1991a, 1992).   
Adult participants are shown a stimulus that is presented for a specific duration of time.  
After multiple trials of being exposed to the standard duration, the participants enter the test 
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phase.  In the test phase the participants are exposed to the same stimulus as before, but this time 
the stimulus is displayed for durations that are either the same or different from the standard 
duration.  For the durations that are different, the values are scaled to be greater and less than the 
standard duration by a fixed amount.  Across trials, the participants view the stimuli and push 
one of two buttons that corresponds to them either agreeing or disagreeing that the most recent 
viewed stimulus was displayed for an amount of time that was the same or different to that of the 
standard duration.  After every submitted response, feedback is given to the participant.  Just like 
the variant used with animals, this task reveals the decision-making criteria adults use when 
determining if time durations are equal to one another or not.     
Another commonly used test for measuring temporal processing in animals is temporal 
bisection.  In this task, the animal (e.g., rat) learns to press a lever (e.g., left lever) when it is 
exposed to a signal of short duration (e.g., 2 seconds) and another lever (e.g., right lever) when it 
is exposed to a signal of long duration (e.g., 8 seconds) (Church & Deluty, 1977).  After learning 
this discriminatory behaviour, the animal is exposed to stimuli (displayed individually) for 
durations that are intermittent of the short and long durations.  The animal must push one of the 
two levers to indicate whether they perceive the stimulus’ duration as being similar to either the 
short or long duration.  The responses of the animal are then typically recorded as a proportion of 
hitting the lever corresponding to the long duration as a function of the stimulus’s duration.  Use 
of such a task reveals the animal’s ability to categorize intermittent times as being similar or 
dissimilar to the standard durations, while showing at approximately what time duration the 
animal is unable to consistently categorize the intermittent duration as being similar to either the 
short or long duration.  As a result, this type of task has been used to exhibit the criteria that 
animals use when discriminating time durations as being distinct from one another. A variant of 
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this task was later developed to determine the decision-making criterion process in humans 
(Allan & Gibbon, 1991; Wearden, 1991b).   
Adult participants are shown a stimulus that is presented for either one of two specific 
durations of time.  The participants learn to push one button for when the stimulus is displayed 
for the duration of time that is the shorter of the two standard durations of time, and another 
button for when the stimulus is displayed for the longer of the two standard durations of time.  
After successful practice trials where the participant is able to view the stimulus and push the 
correct button that corresponds to the duration that it was displayed for, the participants enter the 
test phase.  In the test phase the participants are exposed to the same stimulus as before, but this 
time the stimulus is displayed for durations that are either the same or different from the standard 
durations.  For the durations that are different, the values are scaled by a fixed amount to be 
between the two standard durations in magnitude.  Across trials, the participants view the stimuli 
and push one of two buttons that corresponds to them either believing that the most recent 
viewed stimulus was displayed for a time duration that most closely resembled the short or long 
standard duration.  Just like the variant used with animals, this task reveals the decision-making 
criteria adults use when determining the threshold of what classifies two time durations as being 
distinct from one another.     
The use of temporal generalization and temporal bisection tasks has consequently 
provided evidence for scalar timing properties in adults’ estimation of time durations.  Though 
animal performance on temporal generalization tasks indicated animals show no bias for shorter 
or longer time durations when determining if time durations are similar or not to one another 
(Church & Gibbon, 1982), the same was not entirely true for adults.  Unlike animals, adult 
performance on temporal generalization tasks revealed adults to preferentially select longer times 
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to be the same as the standard duration versus shorter durations that differed from the standard 
duration by equal magnitude (McCormack, Brown, Maylor, Darby, & Green, 1999; Wearden, 
1991a; Wearden, Denovan, & Haworth, 1997; Wearden & Towse, 1994).  With respect to adult 
performance on temporal bisection tasks, Allan and Gibbon (1991) found the bisectional point to 
be the geometric mean—similar to animal performance—of the short and long durations, 
whereas other adult studies found the bisection point to be just below the arithmetic mean 
(Wearden, 1991b; Wearden & Ferrara, 1995; Wearden & Thomas, 1997).  Reasoning to explain 
the latter result could be that adults show a bias to indicate that an intermittent duration is similar 
to the long duration.  Whereas it is likely that adults and animals have different decision-making 
criteria when classifying time durations as being similar or dissimilar, as indicated by adults’ 
bias toward long durations, adults (like animals) still show non-random, scalar properties (i.e., 
conformity to Weber’s Law) in their representations of time durations.   
To better understand the capacity to perceive differences in time, time processing abilities 
were assessed in children to see how functional and refined this capacity is in the early years of 
life.  Since temporal generalization and bisection tasks were able to investigate temporal 
processing in adults under the rubric of SET, these same tasks were applied to young children.  
Droit-Volet, Clément, and Wearden (2001) tested 3-, 5-, and 8-year-old children using temporal 
generalization tasks with standard durations of either 4 or 8 seconds.  Though the performances 
of the 3- and 5-year-old children were similar to one another, they were not similar to the 
performance of adults from earlier studies.  That is, the 3- and 5-year-old children showed no 
bias towards shorter or longer durations when comparing them to the standard duration.  Eight-
year-old children however showed a bias, like adults, towards choosing longer durations to be 
similar to the standard duration but not short durations that differed from the standard duration 
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by the same magnitude of time.   Chronometric counting by the 8-year-old children could not 
have influenced these results, as the results were later replicated using standard durations of 0.4 
and 4 seconds (Droit-Volet, 2002).  Nevertheless, while age seemed to impact the decision-
making criteria for discriminating time durations from one another, age did not influence young 
children’s use of scalar timing when comparing various time durations to a standard.   
Using a temporal bisection task this time, Droit-Volet and Wearden (2001) investigated 
the performance of 3-, 5-, and 8-year-old children with a short and long duration combination of 
either 1 and 4 seconds or 2 and 8 seconds.  Regardless of the age and standard durations used, 
the researchers calculated the bisectional point to be just below the arithmetic mean, suggesting a 
selection bias for overestimating time durations when classifying time durations as being 
relatively long from short.  These findings generated from young children completing temporal 
generalization and temporal bisection tasks suggest non-random, scalar timing is consistent 
across development.  It is therefore possible that the capacity to perceive differences in time is 
even present in infancy.  If so, then infants may have the capacity necessary to process time and 
use temporal information when constructing a knowledge base about events that occur in their 
environment. 
Time Perception in Infancy 
Studying time perception in infants has been quite limited since infants lack the language 
skills and motor precision to follow instructions and make manual responses.  Non-traditional 
timing tasks, therefore, are required to address any temporal processing question down the 
developmental timeline to infants.  A commonly used paradigm for investigating infants’ ability 
to detect changes in temporal sequences has been a variant of the familiarity/novelty-preference 
paradigm (Fagan, 1970; Fantz, 1964; Saayman, Ames, & Moffett, 1964) known as the violation-
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of-expectation paradigm (Baillargeon, Spelke, & Wasserman, 1985).  In this paradigm, infants 
are exposed to a sequence of stimuli depicting a particular event.  After multiple trials where the 
particular event is presumably learned by the infant, there is a novel (sometimes called 
impossible) trial.  The novel trial is unique because it contains a stimulus event that does not 
conform to an assumed “expectation” that the infant would have due to their knowledge of their 
world.  Researchers infer that any change in the infant’s looking behaviour during the novel trial 
is indicative of the infant being able to detect the apparent impossible change in the perceptual 
nature of the event sequence.  Needham and Baillargeon (1993), for example, used the violation-
of-expectation paradigm to investigate 4.5-month-old infants’ knowledge about support events 
(i.e., understanding that items cannot be suspended in mid-air, rather must be resting on 
something).  In this experiment, infants sat in front of an apparatus that contained a platform and 
screen.  From behind the screen, a gloved hand emerged carrying a box.  As the infants saw the 
gloved hand carrying the box over the platform, one of two events occurred.  In the control 
condition, the gloved hand placed the box onto the platform.  In the experimental condition, a 
novel (or impossible) event occurred; the glove hand released the box beyond the platform, 
leaving the box suspended in mid-air with no apparent source of support.  The looking times of 
the infants in each condition were measured.  The infants in the experimental condition looked 
longer at the novel (impossible) event than the infants in the control condition who looked at the 
probable event.  The researchers concluded that the looking time of infants was greater in the 
experimental condition than in the control condition because 4.5-month-old infants have 
knowledge about support and were more surprised to see a box suspended in mid-air than a box 
supported by a platform.               
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  Use of the violation-of-expectation paradigm has subsequently been used by researchers 
by using measures other than looking time to investigate infants’ ability to detect changes in 
temporal sequences.  Colombo and Richman (2002), for example, had 4-month-old infants view 
a light stimulus on a screen that would be on for 2 seconds and then turn off for 3 (or 5, 
depending on the condition) seconds, only to reappear and be on for 2 seconds again.  This 
alternating sequence continued for eight trials until on the ninth trial when the light stimulus did 
not reappear on screen.  The researchers measured the infants’ heart rates and noted a 
deceleration in heart rate on the ninth trial at the time when the light stimulus was to reappear.  
The deceleration in heart rate was interpreted by the researchers to depict the state of surprise the 
infants were in due to the light stimulus not reappearing on screen.  The researchers, therefore, 
concluded that infants as young as 4-months of age were able to detect temporal values of 3 and 
5 seconds.  In a similar study, Boswell, Garner, and Berg (1994) observed that 2-month-old 
infants show a similar deceleration in heart rate in response to an omitted temporal event.   
With yet another different measure, Addyman, Rocha, and Mareschal (2014) recorded the 
onset of eye fixations to an omitted event in infants with ages of 4, 6, 10, and 14 months.  The 
task involved infants viewing a sequence of events on a screen as the onset of their eye fixations 
toward these events was recorded by an eye tracker.  The sequence of events involved a stimulus 
predictably appearing in the same location on a screen.  After multiple trials that provided the 
infants with the opportunity to form an expectation for where and when the stimulus was to 
appear, the stimulus was not displayed at all.  When the stimulus did not appear in its expected 
location, the researchers observed that the infants fixated their eyes onto the area of the screen 
and around the expected time that the stimulus was to appear.  The eye fixation data revealed the 
onset of fixations to be normalized around the onset of the expected omitted event (i.e., at either 
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3 (or 5, depending on the condition) seconds after the previously viewed stimulus’ offset) and the 
variability of the fixations to be proportional to the time interval themselves—suggesting yet 
again that temporal processing consists of a scalar component in infants as young as 4 months of 
age.   
Finally, another measure in the form of physiological data form of event-related 
potentials (ERPs) has provided further evidence that 10-month-old infants, like adults, show 
similar scalar timing properties in brain responses to omitted temporal events (Brannon, Libertus, 
Meck, & Woldorff, 2008).  Ten-month-old infants and adults were exposed to auditory stimuli 
that were separated by an interstimulus interval of 1500 milliseconds.  After successive trials 
where the participants heard the auditory stimuli being presented in a predictable, timed 
sequence, the magnitude of the interstimulus interval for a given trial differed.  Measurement of 
the mismatch negativity (MMN) waveform can suggest if the change in the predictable timed 
sequence of auditory stimuli was perceived.  Analysis of the MMN waveform revealed that 10-
month-old infants, like adults, not only detected the change in the timing of the predictable 
sequence of the presented auditory stimuli, but the amplitude of the waveform was greatest by 
the proportional difference between the standard interstimulus interval (i.e., 1500 milliseconds) 
and the deviant interstimulus interval, and not by the absolute difference between their 
magnitudes.  While the methods used to study time perception in infants have been different to 
those used in animals, adults, and even studies with young children, the results produced by these 
infant time perception studies have revealed a non-random, scalar time processing capacity in 
infants. 
Inspired by SET, studies have shown that adults, children, and even infants possess the 
capacity necessary to discriminate temporal parameters from one another.  While the scalar 
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timing properties observed in humans were predicted by SET, additional theories have emerged 
trying to account for these results as well (see Grondin, 2010, for review).  For instance, while 
the pacemaker of the pacemaker-switch component is believed to emit pulses at a fixed, linear 
rate, other theorists believe the pulses are emitted as an oscillation in response to perceived timed 
events (Jones & Boltz, 1989).  Conversely, there are some theorists that believe a central 
timekeeping mechanism does not exist and, therefore, particular systems and processes within 
organisms have their own capacity to process time (Ivry & Schlerf, 2008; Jantzen, Steinberg, & 
Kelso, 2005).  As the purpose of the current study is not to test different theories or models, I 
will not be discussing them further.  The important issue to address, however, is while humans of 
varying ages have a non-random capacity to perceive differences in time, what is the 
development of this capacity in early infancy? 
Timing in Infants’ Visual Expectations 
As previously pointed out, the ability to perceive differences in time can be thought of as 
a necessary capacity for human cognition (e.g., language comprehension).  Whereas much 
research has been conducted to investigate time processing in adults and what mechanism may 
account for that processing, it is important to question whether individuals actually use their 
perception of time to their advantage.  In particular, there has been very little research that has 
investigated the development of time processing in early infants and if infants actually use time 
information when trying to make sense of the novel environment in which they live.  For 
instance, one way infants can use temporal information when trying to make sense of their 
environment is to encode the temporal regularities of nearby events and use that information 
when forming expectations about those events.  By being able to cognitively index the temporal 
regularity of events and formulate expectations, infants will be able to make predictions about 
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these events, anticipate them, and thereby have more time to spend on processing all the 
information regarding those events.  Having more time to process an event leads to more 
efficient information processing and better comprehension (Haith, Benson, Roberts, & 
Pennington, 1994).  
First developed in 1988, the Visual Expectation Paradigm (VExP) investigated 3.5-
month-old infants’ ability to visually anticipate the location of images on screen (Haith, Hazan, 
& Goodman, 1988).  A classic example of the VExP involved infants viewing images presented 
with fixed duration (e.g., 700 milliseconds) in a simple, left-to-right alternating sequence on a 
screen.  Between the presentations of successive images, there is a fixed interstimulus interval 
(e.g., 1000 milliseconds).  As infants learn the predictable sequence of images appearing on 
screen, they begin to correctly look towards the side of the screen before the image appears (i.e., 
anticipate). Successive studies using the VExP have revealed that infants’ anticipatory looking 
patterns occur even when the sequence of images was more complex (Canfield & Haith, 1991) 
and the content predictability of the images (Adler & Haith, 2003; Wentworth & Haith, 1992) 
were manipulated.  Anticipations were used as an index for observing expectations because 
while expectations are predictions held by the individual, anticipatory eye movements are 
behavioural responses that are guided by expectations.  If an infant creates an expectation of 
where and when an image should appear on screen, then the ability to look to a particular area on 
the screen before any stimulus is presented is a behavioural response (i.e., anticipation) that was 
guided by an internal understanding (i.e., expectation) of the predictable sequence of events.   
To this end, Adler, Haith, Arehart, and Lanthier (2008) attempted to see if 3-month-old 
infants encode the temporal parameter of events and use this information when formulating 
visual expectations.  While the researchers failed to observe infants encode the exact timing of a 
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temporal event, they did observe 3-month-old infants encode the overall temporal flow rate of a 
given event.  That is, the 3-month-old infants were observed to encode the overall timing of a 
repeating set of stimulus events.  This set of stimulus events consisted of an image being 
presented on one side of the screen, followed by an interstimulus interval, then the presentation 
of a second image on the other side of the screen, and finally the occurrence of another 
interstimulus interval.  The overall flow rate for any set of events—which the 3-month-old 
infants were able to encode—lasted for either 2600, 3400, or 4200 milliseconds.  Infants first 
experienced a flow rate of 2600 or 4200 milliseconds and were then shifted to a 3400 
millisecond flow rate.  Infants changed the frequency of their anticipatory eye movements as a 
function of whether they experienced a shift to a shorter or longer flow rate.  These findings 
further support previous findings that young infants do not show a bias toward longer durations, 
having initially shown equivalent anticipation regardless of the magnitude of the flow rate.  As 
already stated, however, the study by Adler et al. (2008) did not show evidence that infants were 
able to encode the exact timing of individual stimulus events and then use that information to 
guide their behaviour.  
The Present Study 
The current study is designed to further investigate the capacity of infants to encode the 
temporal parameter of events and if they use that information when interacting with their 
environment by forming expectations for temporally predictable events.  Unlike previous 
research that investigated young infants’ capacity to perceive differences in time with use of the 
violation-of-expectation paradigm, this study will use a variation of the VExP for 
methodological and potentially theoretical short comings of the violation-of-expectation 
paradigm.  First of all, previous studies on infant time perception have measured infants’ ability 
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to perceive differences in time on the second-scale.  If the capacity to perceive time and temporal 
differences is important for higher-order cognitive processes, then infants should contain a 
temporal capacity that is sensitive to even small differences of time, such as on the scale of 
hundreds of milliseconds.  Secondly, whereas previous studies on infant time perception suggest 
infants can perceive differences in time, the researchers never investigated if infants actually use 
temporal information to their advantage.  By investigating infants’ ability to encode temporal 
information and use it when forming expectations in their environment and making anticipations 
to those expected events will not only address infants’ ability to perceive differences in time—a 
foundational capacity necessary for the functioning of higher-order cognitive processes—but, 
also, that they can use temporal information when making predictions about events in their 
environment.  Finally, perhaps counterintuitive to what the name suggests, the violation-of-
expectation procedure does not actually measure expectations.  An expectation is a prediction an 
individual may have involving something they predict will happen in the future.  Considering 
that an expectation is a prediction about an event that has not happened yet, any observation of 
an expectation should, therefore, occur before the event has happened.  Thus, observing changes 
in behaviour after an expected event has occurred—like what is done in studies using the 
violation-of-expectation paradigm—may not actually be indicative of a violated expectation, but 
of something else.  Research suggests that use of violation-of-expectation paradigms can lead to 
infants developing a preference for the familiar rather than the novel information (Cashon & 
Cohen, 2000; Cohen, 2004; Schilling, 2000).  Since there are aspects of test events that are 
familiar, infants may be responding to that familiarity rather than to any novelty in timing.  As a 
consequence, interpreting findings from violation-of-expectation paradigms are inherently 
difficult.  A study that can address these three positions of discussion will not only advance the 
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current understanding of infant time perception, but will exhibit a capacity sensitive to temporal 
information on the scale of hundreds of milliseconds, which can aid infants in understanding 
their complex environment.   
The Visual Expectation Cueing Paradigm (VExCP) is a variant of the VExP that assesses 
perceptual discrimination.  Unlike the VExP, the VExCP uses central cues to predict the spatial 
location of target stimuli (Baker, Tse, Gerhardstein, & Adler, 2008).  In this paradigm, in order 
for infants to adequately anticipate the location of the target stimuli above chance performance 
they must be able to discriminate the perceptual parameter that distinguishes the central cues.  In 
Baker et al. (2008) 6-month-old infants viewed stimuli on a screen while an eye tracker recorded 
their eye movements.  At the start of every trial, a cue was presented at the center of the screen 
for 2000 milliseconds.  The presented cue was either an image of a circle or square contour made 
up of Gabor patches.  After cue offset, an interstimulus interval of 500 milliseconds occurred.  
After the 500 milliseconds, a target stimulus appeared on the left or right side of the screen for 
1500 milliseconds.  At target offset, the screen remained empty for 250 milliseconds and it was 
after this period when the cue reappeared marking the onset of the subsequent trial.  In the 
experimental condition of the study, the cue predicted the spatial location of the subsequent 
target.  If 6-month-old infants are able to perceptually discriminate circle and square contours 
from one another and use this information when formulating visual expectations, then they 
should be able to correctly anticipate the spatial location of the target stimuli above chance 
performance.  The researchers observed this as 6-month-old infants were able to correctly 
anticipate the location of the target stimuli above chance performance regardless of whether the 
cue was the circle or square contour.  The infants in the control condition, where there was no 
predictable cue–target location relation, anticipated the location of the target stimuli at chance 
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performance.  The researchers concluded that 6-month-old infants can perceptually discriminate 
circle and square contour images from one another and use this content-specific information 
about the cue when forming expectations in their visual environment.            
The purpose of the current study, therefore, is to investigate whether young infants 
possess a capacity for detecting differences in time on the scale of hundreds of milliseconds and 
if such information can be used to formulate expectations.  Such a finding will not only suggest 
that the capacity to perceive differences in time is functional early in life, but that this capacity 
has a functional purpose as it enables infants to better understand their environment by being 
able to formulate expectations on relevant, temporally predictable events.  In order to investigate 
such a capacity and its development, the present study will use the VExCP as its paradigm with 
6- and 3-month-old infants.  Infants will be exposed to a variant of the VExCP that contains cues 
that perceptually deviate from one another by the duration they are displayed for.  Thus, as a 
consequence of this paradigm and manipulation, a direct measure of infants’ ability to formulate 
expectations based on temporal information can be achieved.  If infants are able to use temporal 
information as a distinguishing factor when forming expectations, then they will be able to 
correctly anticipate the spatial location of cued targets at a rate above chance when there is a 
predictable cue duration–target location relation.  
Experiment 1 – Temporal Cueing in 6-Month-Old Infants 
Methods 
Participants.  Forty-four 6- to 7-month-old infants, recruited from a mailing list supplied 
by a Toronto-area marketing company (Z Retail Marketing Company Inc., Toronto, Canada), 
participated in this study.  The data from 20 infants were excluded from this study due to crying 
and general fussiness (n = 12), inattentiveness (i.e., provided data on less than 65% of the trials; 
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n = 5), and experimental error (n = 3).   As a result, 24 infants (11 males, 13 females) who 
ranged in age from 168 to 201 days (M = 180.9, SD = 8.8) and came from middle social 
economic status (SES) were included in the final sample for analysis.  The infants were of 
Caucasian (n = 13), Asian (n = 2), African (n = 1), Hispanic (n = 2), and Other (n = 6) ethnic 
backgrounds.  Infants were all born at full-term, in good health, and with no apparent visual, 
neurological, or other abnormalities as documented by parental recording.  Informed consent was 
given by the parent of each infant.     
Stimuli and apparatus.  The cue and target stimuli were computer-generated images.  The 
cue was a pink and grey checkerboard image, whereas the target stimuli were images of vertical 
stripes, concentric circles, and diamond shapes in various colour combinations of red, green, 
blue, and yellow (see Figure 1).  The stimuli were approximately 4.5° degrees in diameter. 
The infants were laid supine in a specialized crib and viewed the images on a 19-inch 
LCD colour monitor with 1024 x 768 pixel resolution that was mounted 48 centimeters 
overhead.  There was a 30 x 30 centimeter infrared-reflecting, visible-transmitting mirror 
between the infant and monitor.  A remote, pan-tilt infrared eye tracking camera (Model 504, 
Applied Science Laboratories [www.a-s-l.com], Bedford, MA) emitted infrared light that was 
reflected off the mirror and into the infant’s eye (see Figure 2).  The reflection of the infrared 
light coming back from the infant and off the mirror was recorded by the camera at a temporal 
resolution of 60 Hz.  To minimize outside light entry into the crib, black felt curtains were drawn 
over and around the crib. 
Infrared light emitted from the diodes on the camera, reflected from the mirror into the 
infants’ eye, and then reflected back from the infants’ retina through the pupil, produced a 
backlit white pupil.  In addition, the infrared light produced a point of reflection on the cornea of 
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Figure 1.  Stimuli used in Experiments 1 and 2.  The image in the top row was the cue, while the 
remaining six images in the middle and bottom rows were the targets. 
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Figure 2.  Testing crib apparatus. 
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the infants’ eye.  Using proprietary software (Applied Sciences Laboratories), the eye fixation 
position was calculated as the relation between the centroid of the backlit pupil and the corneal 
reflection.  The eye tracker was calibrated by having each infant view a continuous loop of 
varying shapes and colours at two known locations on the screen.  All future recorded eye 
tracker fixation values were filtered through the calibration file to produce measures of eye 
position data. 
Throughout the experimental session, two Dell computers were used.  One computer 
generated and presented the stimuli using the program Direct RT (Empirisoft Inc., New York; 
www.empirisoft.com/DirectRT.aspx).  The stimuli generated and displayed onto this computer 
were relayed to the LCD monitor that was above the crib.  This allowed the experimenter to 
simultaneously view what the infant was viewing.  The second Dell computer was used to 
control the eye tracker and record the data collected from it.  The stimulus-generating computer 
sent a unique, time-stamped numerical code, indicating the onset and type of trial, through a 
parallel port to the data-collecting computer.  Synchronization of the unique code with the eye 
movement data in the data file allowed coordination of the eye movement sequences to specific 
stimuli and their onsets.  
Procedure.  Each infant was exposed to 60 experimental trials.  Each experimental trial 
started with the cue being displayed at the center of a greyscale screen for a duration of either 
700 or 1200 milliseconds.  The magnitude of the cue’s duration on any given trial was selected at 
random, but every infant was exposed to 30 trials of each of the two cue durations.  After cue 
offset, an interstimulus interval (ISI) of 1000 milliseconds followed during which the screen was 
empty.  After the ISI, one of six target stimuli were randomly selected and presented either on 
the left or right side of the screen with a visual angle of 5.5° from the center of the screen. The 
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target remained fixed on the screen for 1000 milliseconds.  At target offset, the screen remained 
empty for an intertrial interval of 500 milliseconds.  After the 500 milliseconds passed, the cue 
reappeared at the center of the screen signalling the onset of the next trial (see Figure 3). 
Infants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions.  In the experimental condition, 
there was a predictable cue duration–target location relation.  That is, the cue’s duration 
predicted the location of the target stimulus with 100% validity.  For example, if the cue was 
presented for 700 milliseconds then the target would be presented on the left side of the screen, 
while the target would be presented on the right side of the screen if the cue was presented for 
1200 milliseconds.  The cue–side relation was counterbalanced between participants.  In the 
control condition, there was no predictable cue duration–target location relation.  This meant that 
the duration of the cue provided no reliable prediction as to which side of the screen the target 
stimulus was to appear on (see Figure 3).  The control condition served as a baseline 
measurement for infants’ chance eye movement performance when there was no predictable 
relation upon which to form an expectation.  In total, 12 infants were assigned to each condition.   
Data reduction and analysis.  The raw digital data recorded by the eye tracker were 
imported into a MATLAB toolbox called ILAB (Gitelman, 2002) for analysis.  ILAB separated 
individual eye movements into its horizontal and vertical components while displaying the 
components on a trial-by-trial basis.  ILAB also displayed the scan path of the eye, which 
allowed eye movements to be analyzed based on its timing, direction, and distance relative to the 
stimuli shown on screen.   
For an eye movement to be included in the final data sample, it had to meet a number of 
criteria.  First, as the critical question is whether infants use temporal information when forming 
expectations, the infants had to fixate on the cue for any trial to be considered valid.  Second, in  
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Figure 3.  Example schematic of experimental conditions that had either a predictable or 
unpredictable cue duration–target location relation.  Each infant was assigned to one of the two 
condition types.  The cue was either presented for 700 or 1200 milliseconds.  An interstimulus 
interval (ISI) of 1000 milliseconds followed the offset of the cue.  Then, one of six target stimuli 
appeared at random for 1000 milliseconds either on the left or right side of the screen.  At target 
stimulus offset, an intertrial interval (ITI) of 500 milliseconds occurred.  In the predictable 
condition the cue’s duration predicted the location of the target, but no such relation existed in 
the unpredictable condition—the target stimuli appeared on the left and right side of the screen at 
random. 
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order for an eye movement to be counted as anticipatory it needed to occur between 133 
milliseconds after cue offset and 133 milliseconds after target onset.  This latency value was 
chosen as the anticipation cut-off because it has been previously determined that 6-month-old 
infants cannot make eye movements in reaction to the onset of a stimulus faster than 133 
milliseconds (Canfield, Smith, Brezsnyak, & Snow, 1997).  If the eye movement occurred 
between 133 milliseconds after target onset and 133 milliseconds after target offset, it was 
considered reactive in nature (see Figure 4).  Third, in order for an infant’s data to be included in 
the final sample, they must have looked at the stimuli on a minimum of 65% of the trials (e.g., 
Adler & Haith, 2003; Adler & Orprecio, 2006).  Finally, the eye movement to the target had to 
trace a path that is more than 50% of the distance between the cue and the target.  The 50% 
criterion has been used in previous studies using infants’ eye movements (e.g., Adler & Haith, 
2003; Adler & Orprecio, 2006) and is typically taken as an indication that the eye movement was 
intentional and not random. 
Infants’ eye movement data were analyzed in terms of three dependent measures.  First, a 
total anticipation measure was calculated by taking the percentage of all valid eye movements 
that were made to the targets that were anticipations (correct and incorrect).  Second, a correct 
anticipation measure was calculated in terms of the percent of all anticipations that correctly 
localized target locations.  Finally, the median reactive latencies of all eye movements towards 
the target after its onset and that were not anticipatory in nature were calculated.  The latter has 
been chosen to be a dependent measure because though some past studies have shown a 
dissociation between anticipatory and reactive eye movements (e.g., Adler and Haith, 2003), the 
dissociation is not entirely exclusive (Haith, Hazan, & Goodman, 1988; Haith & McCarty, 1990; 
Haith, Wentworth, & Canfield, 1993).  It can be interpreted that the facilitation of reactive eye  
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Figure 4.  Criteria for classifying eye movements as anticipatory or reactive.  Since the quickest 
eye movement a 6-month-old infant can make in response to a stimulus’ onset or offset is 133 
milliseconds, an anticipatory eye movement had to occur between 133 milliseconds after cue 
offset and before 133 milliseconds after target onset.  A reactive eye movement had to occur 
between 133 milliseconds after target onset and before 133 milliseconds after target offset. 
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movement latencies toward stimuli is an index of an underlying expectation.  Finally, 
considering that majority of the valid eye movements exhibited by infants are reactive and not 
anticipatory, it is important to include them.    
Results and Discussion 
Total Anticipations.  Though correct anticipations are the primary measure of interest, 
prior to analyzing that measure it is necessary to insure that any possible differences between 
conditions are not due to the total number of anticipations made.  A 2 x 2 mixed-design analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) was performed on the percent of total anticipations, with Condition 
(predictable, unpredictable) as a between-participant factor and Cue Duration (700, 1200) as a 
within-participant factor.  The analysis revealed a significant main effect of Cue Duration, 
F(1,44) = 4.69, p < .05, d = .54, indicating that 6-month-old infants made more anticipations 
when the cue was displayed for 1200 milliseconds (M = 44.54%, SE = 5.19) than when it was 
displayed for 700 milliseconds (M = 35.63%, SE = 4.25).  Neither the main effect of Condition, 
F(1,44) = 0.74, ns, or the interaction between Condition and Cue Duration, F(1,44) = 1.71, ns, 
were significant (see Table 1 of the Appendix for mean responses across Condition and Cue 
Duration).  The results from this analysis suggest that the number of anticipations, regardless if 
correct or not, were not determined by the cue duration–target location relation.  That said, cue 
duration did influence the total number of anticipations made (see Figure 5).  Since neither 
condition elicited a difference in the total number of anticipations, any difference subsequently 
observed in correct anticipations by condition type cannot be attributed to differences in total 
anticipations.  
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Figure 5. This figure represents the mean percent of total anticipations that 6-month-old infants 
made to the targets based on the cue durations in both the predictable and unpredictable 
conditions.  Error bars represent +/- 1 standard error of the mean.  There was a significant main 
effect of cue duration, as more anticipations were made after the cue was displayed for 1200 
rather than 700 milliseconds. 
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Correct Anticipations.  To determine if 6-month-old infants can discriminate and use 
distinct temporal information when forming expectations, the percentage of anticipations that 
correctly predicted the target’s location was assessed.  If 6-month-old infants are able to 
discriminate and use temporal information in their expectations then they should have made 
correct anticipations in the predictable condition at a rate greater than 50% (chance 
performance).  If, however, the infants could not discriminate between the temporal values of the 
cues then they would not be able to form a cue duration–target location expectation and would 
consequently anticipate the correct target location only by chance, or at a rate not different than 
50% correct.  Conversely, for 6-month-old infants in the unpredictable condition, where there is 
no predictable cue duration–target location relation and hence no expectation to form, they 
should have made correct anticipations at a rate equal to 50%. 
A 2 x 2 mixed-design ANOVA was performed on the percent of correct anticipations 
with Condition (predictable, random) as a between-participant factor and Cue Duration (700, 
1200) as a within-participant factor.  The analysis revealed a significant main effect of 
Condition, F(1,44) = 10.44, p < .01, d = .94, indicating that 6-month-old infants made more 
correct anticipations in the predictable condition (M = 70.49%, SE = 5.25) than in the 
unpredictable condition (M = 48.05%, SE = 4.49).  This finding suggests 6-month-old infants 
were able to discriminate the cues’ durations and successfully use the temporal information when 
the cue duration–target location relation was predictable (see Figure 6).  There was no main 
effect of Cue Duration, F(1,44) = 1.53, ns, nor a significant interaction between Condition and 
Cue Duration, F(1,44) = 0.85, ns, however, indicating infants exhibited a similar percentage of 
correct anticipations for each cue duration in both the predictable and unpredictable conditions 
(see Table 1 of the Appendix for mean responses across Condition and Cue Duration).  
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Figure 6. This figure represents the mean percent of correct anticipations that 6-month-old 
infants made to the targets based on the cue durations in both the predictable and unpredictable 
conditions.  The dashed line represents performance at chance (50%).  Asterisks symbolize 
performance that was significantly greater than chance performance.  Error bars represent +/- 1 
standard error of the mean. 
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While the previous analysis exhibited a difference in percentage of correct anticipations 
due to condition type, it did not take into account if the 6-month-old infants made correct 
anticipations at a rate that was significantly greater than chance or 50%.  With cue duration 
collapsed, due to no main effect of Cue Duration, a one-tailed, one-sample t-test indicated that 6-
month-old infants in the predictable condition made correct anticipations at a rate greater than 
chance, t(23) = 3.82, p < .001, d = .80, whereas the infants in the unpredictable condition did not,  
t(23) = 0.43, ns.  Additional one-tailed, one-sample t-tests revealed that 6-month old infants in 
the predictable condition made correct anticipations at a rate greater than 50% when the cue was 
displayed for 700 milliseconds, t(11) = 2.76, p < .05, d = .83, and for 1200 milliseconds, t(11) = 
2.59, p < .05, d = .75.  Six-month-old infants in the unpredictable condition, however, made 
correct anticipations at a rate not significantly different than chance when the cue was displayed 
for either 700 milliseconds, t(11) = 1.44, ns, or 1200 milliseconds, t(11) = 0.97, ns.  These 
findings indicate that 6-month-old infants were able to discriminate the two cue durations and 
make correct anticipations at a rate greater than chance when the cue duration–target location 
relation was predictable but not when it was unpredictable.    
Reactive Latencies.  In order to assess the effect of condition and cue duration on reactive 
latencies, a 2 x 2 mixed-design ANOVA was performed on median reactive latencies, with 
Condition (predictable, random) as a between-participant factor and Cue Duration (700, 1200) as 
a within-participant factor.  This analysis did not reveal a significant main effect of Condition, 
F(1,44) = 3.06, ns, of Cue Duration, F(1,44) = 1.65, ns, or a significant interaction between 
Condition and Cue Duration, F(1,44) = 0.37, ns (see Table 1 of the Appendix for mean responses 
across Condition and Cue Duration).  The results from this analysis suggest that the 
predictability of the cue duration–target location relation and the cue duration did not influence 
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6-month-old infants’ reactive latencies towards the targets (see Figure 7).  Though the percent of 
correct anticipations and reactive latencies revealed a dissociation in their influence by infants’ 
visual expectations, consistent with Adler et al. (2008), the correct anticipations clearly 
demonstrate that 6-month-old infants encoded the temporal information of events to form an 
expectation and used such information when making behavioural decisions. 
Experiment 2 – Temporal Cueing in 3-Month-Old Infants 
Considering the findings from the previous experiment, it seems possible that the use of 
temporal information in infants’ visual expectations may be present earlier in life.  The purpose 
of this experiment was to attempt to determine a developmental timeline for the capacity to 
detect differences in time on the scale of hundreds of milliseconds and if such information can be 
used to formulate expectations.  This was made possible by conducting the same experiment as 
before but with 3-month-old infants as the age of interest instead of 6-month-old infants.  
Whereas previous research has suggested that infants as young as 3-months of age can perceive 
differences in time (e.g., Adler et al., 2008; Boswell et al., 1994; Clifton, 1974), none have 
investigated if infants of this age can perceive differences in individual events’ timing on the 
scale of hundreds of milliseconds for the purpose of moderating active behaviour.  As well, 3-
month-old infants have been observed to encode and incorporate the spatial (Canfield & Haith, 
1991) and content information (Adler & Haith, 2003; Wentworth & Haith, 1992) of individual 
events into their visual expectations.  This experiment, therefore, has the potential of exposing 
another event-specific parameter that 3-month-old infants may use when forming visual 
expectations.  If the capacity to perceive differences in time on the scale of hundreds of 
milliseconds is present in early infancy, then 3-month-old infants should be able to incorporate  
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Figure 7. This figure represents the mean reactive latencies that 6-month-old infants made to the 
targets based on the cue durations in both the predictable and unpredictable conditions.  Error 
bars represent +/- 1 standard error of the mean. 
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temporal information when formulating visual expectations in their environment.  Findings from 
this study, therefore, may reveal just how early in human development the individual becomes 
informed of the relevant temporal information present in their environment.   
Methods 
Participants.  Forty 3- to 4-month-old infants, recruited from a mailing list supplied by a 
Toronto-area marketing company (Z Retail Marketing Company Inc., Toronto, Canada), 
participated in this study.  The data from 16 infants had to be excluded from this study due to 
crying and general fussiness (n = 5) and inattentiveness (i.e., provided data on less than 65% of 
the trials; n = 11).   As a result, 24 infants (15 males, 9 females) who ranged in age from 91 to 
127 days (M = 104.2, SD = 9.0) and came from middle (n = 20) and high (n = 4) social economic 
status (SES) were included in the final sample for analysis.  The infants were of Caucasian (n = 
13), Asian (n = 3), African (n = 2), Hispanic (n = 1), and Other (n = 5) ethnic backgrounds.  
Infants were all born at full term, in good health, and with no apparent visual, neurological, or 
other abnormalities as documented by parental recording.  Informed consent was given by the 
parent of each infant. 
Stimuli and apparatus.  The stimuli and apparatus used for Experiment 2 were identical 
to those used in Experiment 1. 
Procedure.  The procedure, including durations, interstimulus and intertrial intervals, and 
study conditions used for Experiment 2 were identical to those used in Experiment 1. 
Data reduction and analysis.  Data reduction and analysis for Experiment 2 was identical 
to that for Experiment 1 with one major exception.  In order for an eye movement to be counted 
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as anticipatory it needed to occur between 167 milliseconds after cue offset and 167 milliseconds 
after target onset.  This latency value was chosen as the anticipation cut-off because it has been 
previously determined that 3-month-old infants cannot make eye movements in reaction to the 
onset of a stimulus faster than 167 milliseconds (Canfield et al., 1997).  If the eye movement 
occurred between 167 milliseconds after target onset and 167 milliseconds after target offset, it 
was considered reactive in nature (see Figure 8). 
Results and Discussion 
Total Anticipations.  As in Experiment 1, prior to analyzing the primary measure of 
correct anticipations, an analysis had to be done to insure that any possible differences between 
conditions are not due to the total number of anticipations made.  A 2 x 2 mixed-design ANOVA 
was performed on the percent of total anticipations with Condition (predictable, random) as a 
between-participant factor and Cue Duration (700, 1200) as a within-participant factor.  The 
analysis did not reveal a significant main effect of Condition, F(1,44) = 0.31, ns, of Cue 
Duration, F(1,44) = 0.55, ns, or an interaction between the two, F(1,44) = 0.11, ns (see Table 2 
of the Appendix for mean responses across Condition and Cue Duration).  The results from this 
analysis suggest the number of anticipations, regardless if correct or not, were not determined by 
the cue duration–target location relation (see Figure 9).  Since neither condition elicited a 
difference in the total number of anticipations made, any difference observed in correct 
anticipations by condition type could not be attributed to a difference in total anticipations. 
Correct Anticipations.  To determine if 3-month-old infants can discriminate and use 
distinct temporal information when forming expectations, the percentage of anticipations that 
correctly predicted the target’s location was assessed.  If 3-month-old infants, like the 6-month- 
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Figure 8.  Criteria for classifying eye movements as anticipatory or reactive.  Since the quickest 
eye movement a 3-month-old infant can make in response to a stimulus’ onset or offset is 167 
milliseconds, an anticipatory eye movement had to occur between 167 milliseconds after cue 
offset and before 167 milliseconds after target onset.  A reactive eye movement had to occur 
between 167 milliseconds after target onset and before 167 milliseconds after target offset. 
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Figure 9. This figure represents the mean percent of total anticipations that 3-month-old infants 
made to the targets based on the cue durations in both the predictable and unpredictable 
conditions.  Error bars represent +/- 1 standard error of the mean.   
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old infants in Experiment 1, are able to discriminate and use temporal information when 
formulating expectations then they should have made correct anticipations in the predictable 
condition at a rate greater than 50% (chance performance).  If, however, the infants could not 
discriminate between the temporal values of the cues then they would not be able to form a cue 
duration–target location expectation and would consequently anticipate the correct target 
location only by chance, or at a rate not different than 50% correct.  Conversely, 3-month-old 
infants in the unpredictable condition, like the 6-month-old infants, where there is no predictable 
cue duration–target location relation and hence no expectation to form, should have made correct 
anticipations at a rate equal to 50%. 
A 2 x 2 mixed-design ANOVA was performed on the percent of correct anticipations 
with Condition (predictable, random) as a between-participant factor and Cue Duration (700, 
1200) as a within-participant factor.  The analysis did not reveal a significant main effect of 
Condition, F(1,44) = 1.29, ns, indicating that 3-month-old infants in the predictable condition (M 
= 59.32%, SE = 6.95) did not make more correct anticipations than infants in the unpredictable 
condition (M = 48.61%, SE = 5.88).  This finding suggests 3-month-old infants were not able to 
discriminate the cues’ durations and successfully use the temporal information when the cue 
duration–target location relation was predictable (see Figure 10).  There was no main effect of 
Cue Duration, F(1,44) = 0.02, ns, nor a significant interaction between Condition and Cue 
Duration, F(1,44) = 0.63, ns (see Table 2 of the Appendix for mean responses across Condition 
and Cue Duration).  
While the previous analysis failed to exhibit a difference in percentage of correct 
anticipations due to condition type, it did not take into account if the 3-month-old infants made  
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Figure 10. This figure represents the mean percent of correct anticipations that 3-month-old 
infants made to the targets based on the cue durations in both the predictable and unpredictable 
conditions.  The dashed line represents performance at chance (50%).  Error bars represent +/- 1 
standard error of the mean. 
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correct anticipations at a rate that was greater than chance or 50%.  Collapsing across cue 
durations, as the previous analysis did not reveal a difference between the different cue 
durations, a one-tail, one-sample t-test indicated that 3-month-old infants in the predictable 
condition did not make correct anticipations at a rate greater than chance, t(23) = 1.28, ns, as 
neither did 3-month-old infants in the unpredictable condition,  t(23) = 0.24, ns.  Additional one-
tail, one-sample t-tests revealed that 3-month old infants in the predictable condition did not 
make correct anticipations at a rate greater than 50% when the cue was displayed for 700 
milliseconds, t(11) = 0.54, ns, nor when the cue was displayed for 1200 milliseconds, t(11) = 
1.27, ns.  As expected, 3-month-old infants in the unpredictable condition made correct 
anticipations at a rate no different than chance when the cue was displayed for either 700 
milliseconds, t(11) = 0.26, ns, or 1200 milliseconds, t(11) = 1.06, ns.  These findings seem to 
strongly indicate that 3-month-old infants were not able to discriminate the two cue durations, 
thereby forming a cue duration–target location expectation and make correct anticipations at a 
rate greater than chance when the cue duration–target location relation was predictable.   
Reactive Latencies.  As in Experiment 1, the majority of valid eye movements were not 
anticipatory in nature but were reactive after target onset.  In order to assess the effect of 
condition and cue duration on the latencies of these reactive eye movements, a 2 x 2 mixed-
design ANOVA was performed on median reactive latencies, with Condition (predictable, 
random) as a between-participant factor and Cue Duration (700, 1200) as a within-participant 
factor.  Consistent with Experiment 1 and Adler et al. (2008), this analysis did not reveal a 
significant main effect of Condition, F(1,44) = 1.66, ns, of Cue Duration, F(1,44) = 0.04, ns, or a 
significant interaction between Condition and Cue Duration, F(1,44) = 0.08, ns (see Table 2 of 
the Appendix for mean responses across Condition and Cue Duration).  The results from this 
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analysis suggest that the predictability of the cue duration–target location relation did not 
influence 3-month-old infants’ reactive latencies towards the targets differently (see Figure 11).   
Together, these findings reveal that 3-month-old infants, unlike the 6-month-old infants 
in Experiment 1, were not sensitive to temporal differences in the cue duration and, 
consequently, were not able to detect the predictability of cue duration–target location relation.  
Without the capacity to detect that predictability, 3-month-old infants could not form an 
expectation and thereby exhibited anticipations at chance performance when the cue durations 
predicted a target’s location.  The findings from Experiment 2, therefore, demonstrate that 3-
month-old infants are unable to detect differences in time on the scale of hundreds of 
milliseconds and use such information when moderating their behavioural responses. 
General Discussion 
The purpose of the current study was to investigate if young infants possess a capacity for 
processing time information and if they use time information when trying to form a knowledge 
base for events in their environment.  Findings from these experiments suggest that as young as 6 
months, but not 3 months of age infants can detect differences among the temporal parameters of 
events on the scale of hundreds of milliseconds and can then use this information when 
formulating expectations in their environment.  Evidence of this comes from 6-month-old infants 
being able to make anticipations above chance performance when there was a predictable cue 
duration–target location relation, but failed to do so when the cue duration–target location 
relation was unpredictable.  Three-month-old infants, in contrast, failed to discriminate the 
temporal parameters of the cues from one another and were thus unable to successfully use this 
information when formulating expectations.  As a consequence, 3-month-old infants were unable  
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Figure 11. This figure represents the mean reactive latencies that 3-month-old infants made to 
the targets based on the cue durations in both the predictable and unpredictable conditions.  Error 
bars represent +/- 1 standard error of the mean. 
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to make anticipations above chance performance even when the cue duration–target location 
relation was predictable.  In fact, the performance of the 3-month-old infants in the condition 
with a predictable cue duration–target location relation mirrored the performance of the 3-month-
old infants in the condition with an unpredictable cue duration–target location relation.  These 
findings may suggest that there is a developmental transition point between 3 months and 6 
months of age in sensitivity to time differences on the scale of hundreds of milliseconds and the 
ability to use this temporal information when moderating behavioural responses. 
The capacity to process time information and use it when moderating behavioural 
responses is a capacity that allows individuals to potentially function more efficiently in their 
environment (Buhusi & Meck, 2005).  For this reason, therefore, a number of studies have been 
devoted to understanding the developmental trajectory of the capacity to perceive time.  Though 
similar methodological paradigms were used to study temporal processing in adults and young 
children, unique paradigms had to be designed and used for the studying of infant time 
perception due to methodological-related and behavioural limitations (e.g., infants lack the 
ability to press buttons and, therefore, cannot complete a temporal generalization task similar to 
those used on adults and young children).  As a consequence, studies investigating infant time 
perception have defaulted to using a version of the familiarity/novelty-preference paradigm, 
called the violation-of-expectation paradigm.  Though studies using the violation-of-expectation 
paradigm have suggested infants can perceive seconds-long temporal differences between the 
timing of events time (Addyman et al., 2014; Boswell et al., 1994; Brannon et al., 2008; 
Colombo & Richman), as discussed earlier, the nature of the paradigm makes clear interpretation 
difficult.  First, the violation-of-expectation paradigm does not measure expectations, as 
expectations are predictions that occur before a particular event has occurred.   In studies that use 
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the violation-of-expectation paradigm, the dependent variable, which is used to provide evidence 
for infants’ having expectations, is measured after the “expected” event has occurred.  This 
criticism is merely not one of semantics either, as there is empirical evidence that suggests that 
the conclusions generated from violation-of-expectation studies may explained by means other 
than a violated “expectation.”  Hunter, Ames, and Koopman (1983) investigated how young 
infants’ preference for looking at novel stimuli after familiarization to other stimuli is influenced 
by the amount of time infants were given to become familiarized to the stimuli, the age of the 
infants, and the difference in perceptual complexity between the familiarized and novel stimuli.  
With respect to studies using violation-of-expectation paradigms, it is, therefore, possible that the 
explanation behind the findings were not due to infants having the novelty of their 
“expectations” violated, but rather infants choosing to continue looking at those perceptual 
characteristics that were perceptually familiar to them.  The present study was designed, 
therefore, to overcome this (and other) limitation and to better address whether young infants can 
process the temporal parameter of events and use such temporal information when formulating 
expectations, and the development of these abilities.  If infants are able to process the timing of 
events and use this information when formulating expectations, then they will be able to 
moderate their behavioural responses (i.e., anticipatory eye movements) so that they are matched 
with the timing of temporally predictable events.  The VExCP, therefore unlike the violation-of-
expectation paradigm, provides a methodology that measures behavioural responses that cannot 
lead to an interpretability issue as the only way infants can correctly anticipate the location of the 
targets is if they are able to discriminate the temporal parameters of the cues.  The findings 
demonstrated that 6-month-old infants were able to successfully discriminate durations of 700 
milliseconds from 1200 milliseconds, as seen by the percentage of correct anticipations they 
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made when there was a predictable cue duration–target location relation relative to when it was 
random.  In contrast to the findings with 6-month-old infants, 3-month-old infants were unable to 
properly discriminate the temporal durations of 700 milliseconds from 1200 milliseconds.  This 
was observed as the 3-month-old infants failed to correctly anticipate the location of targets 
above chance performance even when there was a predictable cue duration–target location 
relation.  The findings from this study suggest that the use of the VExCP can assess sensitivity to 
timing on the scale of hundreds of milliseconds and that this task is more viable than the 
violation-of-expectation paradigm for assessing the development of temporal processing.    
While the current findings would seem to suggest that 3-month-old infants lack the 
capacity to perceive differences in time on the scale of hundreds of milliseconds, there is an 
alternative possibility.  The temporal parameter of events used throughout Experiments 1 and 2 
were 700 and 1200 milliseconds. Recent research suggests infants as young as 4 months of age 
optimally discriminate temporal parameters that differ by a ratio of 1:3 (Provasi, Rattat, & Droit-
Volet, 2011), with this optimal ratio decreasing with increasing age (Brannon, Suanda, & 
Libertus, 2007).   That is, the temporal parameters that are to be discriminated have previously 
been shown to need to differ from one another by a magnitude of three or more for infants that 
are younger than 4 months of age.  Thus, the possibility exists that 3-month-old infants can 
discriminate temporal information on the scale of hundreds of milliseconds and then use that 
information in formulating expectations, but that the temporal parameters used in the current 
study did not sufficiently differ to activate the 3-month-old infants’ sensitivity—the temporal 
parameters used in the present study differed by a ratio just under 1:2.  To explore the validity of 
this possibility, a follow-up experiment to Experiment 2 in which the ratio is changed to better 
match their hypothetical sensitivity would need to be conducted.  This potential study would be 
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identical to Experiment 2 with the noticeable exception that the temporal parameters of the cues 
would be 500 and 2000 milliseconds.  By the temporal parameters differing from one another by 
a factor of four, whether 3-month-old infants can discriminate and incorporate temporal 
information on the scale of hundreds of milliseconds into the formation of visual expectations 
could be assessed.  If such a proposed temporal difference manipulation does not provide 
evidence for discrimination, then the notion that 3-month-old infants do not possess such a 
temporal capacity would be supported.  Nevertheless, while it is worth further investigating the 
temporal processing capacity (or lack of) in 3-month-old infants, that 6-month-old infants, but 
not 3-month-old infants, were successfully able to discriminate temporal differences near a 1:2 
ratio and incorporate that temporal information into their visual expectations suggests a 
developmental process is mediating a change in temporal sensitivity. 
A plausible process to account for why performance differed among these two age groups 
may be related to neural development.  Neurons in the pre-supplementary motor and 
supplementary motor areas have been linked to controlling self-initiated actions (Mushiake, 
Inase, & Tanji, 1991) and their temporal organization (Tanji, 2001; Shima & Tanji, 1998).  
Further investigation of these neurons has led to the observation that they show selective firing in 
the presence of the temporal, rather than the content, information of a viewed event (Mita, 
Mushiake, Shima, Matsuzaka, & Tanji, 2009).  That these neurons exhibit temporal encoding 
properties is functionally important, but perhaps of equal interest may be where these structures 
reside anatomically.  The supplementary and pre-supplementary motor areas share projections 
with the frontal eye fields (Gould, Cusick, Pons, & Kaas, 1986; Huerta, Krubitzer, & Kaas, 
1987), and the frontal eye fields have been associated with generating anticipatory saccades 
(Keating, 1991; Ramkumar, Lawlor, Glaser, Wood, Phillips, Segraves, & Kording, 2016).  A 
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logical hypothesis to make, therefore, is to propose that the temporal information gathered by the 
neurons in the supplementary and pre-supplementary motor areas may be integrated into the 
process of generating anticipatory saccades from the frontal eye fields.  As the brain develops 
with age, the sensitivity of detecting temporal information by the neurons of the supplementary 
and pre-supplementary motor cortex and/or the efficiency of projecting such information to the 
frontal eye fields may become more refined.  For instance, there is structural maturation of 
myelin in the frontal and temporal lobes of the brain that occurs from 6 to 8 months of age 
(Deoni et al., 2011).  The maturation of myelin may, therefore, aid the efficiency of temporal 
information being projected from the supplementary and pre-supplementary motor areas to the 
frontal eye fields as anticipatory eye movements are generated.  Consequently, this framework 
provides a plausible anatomical explanation as to why 6-month-old, but not 3-month-old infants 
were able to successfully incorporate distinct events’ temporal information when making 
anticipatory saccades. 
Emergence of Discrete Time Processing 
The findings from the current study may suggest a developmental transition from 3 
months to 6 months of age, where sensitivity and application of detecting and discriminating 
temporal information on the scale of hundreds of milliseconds emerges.  A potential reason for 
this may be explainable by Dynamic Systems Theory.  Dynamic Systems Theory postulates that 
the emergence of developing functional capacities does not occur until it serves a function 
(Thelen, 2005).  It is, therefore, possible that 6-month-old, but not 3-month-old infants possess 
the capacity to detect and discriminate differences in time on the scale of hundreds of 
milliseconds when formulating expectations in their environment because it facilitates the 
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development of other cognitive processes and behaviours.  One example of a functional 
cognitive process that requires the ability to detect and discriminate small differences among 
temporal events is language (de Diego-Balaguer, Martinez-Alvarez, & Pons, 2016). 
Though challenging to determine the exact onset for language development, the second 
half of the first year of life has been considered a reasonable approximation (Kuhl, 2004).  As the 
sensitivity for discriminating temporal durations increases with age (Brannon et al., 2007; 
McCormack et al., 1999), so does infants’ sensitivity towards language-specific phonemic 
discrimination (Eimas, Siqueland, Juscyk, & Vigorito, 1971; Kuhl, Williams, Lacerda, Stevens, 
& Lindblom, 1992; Werker & Tees, 2002).  Phonemes, which are distinct millisecond temporal 
events, are the basic units of sound that distinguishes words from one another in a particular 
language.  In order to discriminate phonemes from one another, individuals must be able to 
detect temporal differences as small as 20 milliseconds in the vocal onset asynchronies of these 
produced sounds (Eimas et al., 1971).   The ability to discriminate and produce phonemes, 
therefore, can be thought of as one of the first capacities an individual must develop before they 
can acquire a complete comprehension of language (Gibson & Levin, 1975).  The development 
of language, or phonemic discrimination to be exact, can be viewed as an ability that does not 
become relevant to an infant until the latter half of their first year of life.  From a Dynamic 
System Theory perspective with respect to language development, it can be postulated that the 
capacity to detect and discriminate small differences among temporal events and then use this 
information when categorizing phonemes as either relevant or not to one’s language is not 
needed until the individual is ready to develop phonemic discrimination.  If this is the case, then 
it can potentially explain the speculated developmental transition from 3 months to 6 months of 
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age where the sensitivity and functional application of detecting and discriminating small 
differences in time emerges.  
Another example of a developing behaviour that necessitates the capacity to process 
small parameters of time and one’s ability to use this temporal information is the ability to 
anticipate and reach for moving objects.  Emerging approximately at 5 months of age, reaching 
is an adaptive behaviour that allows infants to physically interact with stimuli in their 
environment (White, Castle, & Held, 1964).  Von Hofsten, Vishton, Spelke, Feng, & Rosander, 
(1998) observed 6-month-old infants adapt their reaching behaviour to match the trajectory of 
moving objects.  It can be inferred, therefore, that the infants were able to reach for moving 
objects because they were able to detect and use the temporal information present in the moving 
object’s trajectory.  Since reaching for moving objects does not develop until at least 6 months of 
age, it is possible that a reason why 3-month-old infants failed to detect and discriminate 
differences in time on the scale of hundreds of milliseconds is because it does not serve as a 
capacity necessary for the development of emerging cognitive processes and behaviours.  
Whereas, the capacity to detect and discriminate temporal events on the scale of hundreds of 
milliseconds can be inferred to facilitate 6-month-old infants’ ability to reach for moving objects.     
Future Directions:  ADHD Research 
The tasks used to understand temporal processing in adults and children have been 
relatively consistent.  As a consequence, the performances of adults and children on certain 
temporal tasks (e.g., temporal generalization) have allowed researchers to directly compare the 
performances of each group.  When studying infants, however, the tasks and measures used are 
typically distinct from those used on adults and children.  Comparing and contrasting the 
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findings of infant studies to those with adults and children is therefore difficult.   Due to this 
difficulty in comparing and contrasting the findings, it is, therefore, challenging to map out the 
development of temporal processing.  As eye movements are relatively mature in early infancy 
(Canfield et al., 1997), they provide the potential for conducting studies that use the same tasks 
and comparable behavioural measures across the developmental spectrum (see Adler & Gallego, 
2014; Adler & Orprecio, 2006).  As infants as young as 6 months of age were observed to 
complete a temporal discrimination task by use of the VExCP, the VExCP and eye movements 
can be used as a task and measure, respectively, to address the development of temporal 
processing across different age groups and in certain distinct populations.  One such example 
would be mapping out the developmental trajectory of temporal processing in individuals that 
have attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).       
Research on individuals with ADHD has shown that they seem to have impairment in 
temporal judgements.  Neural structures that have been correlated with discriminating events’ 
temporal parameters on the scale of hundreds of milliseconds, which include the right 
dorsolateral and inferior prefrontal cortices, left cerebellum and right supplementary motor area 
(Smith, Taylor, Lidzba, & Rubia, 2003), have also been observed to be dysfunctional in 
individuals diagnosed with ADHD (Noreika, Falter, & Rubia, 2013).  The presence of 
dysfunctional neural time processing mechanisms has motivated researchers to hypothesize that 
individuals diagnosed with ADHD have difficulty perceiving differences in time.  Specifically, 
adults and children diagnosed with ADHD have been observed to show temporal processing 
deficits in discriminating temporal parameters on the scale of hundreds of milliseconds when 
compared to healthy controls (Valko, Schneider, Doehnert, Müller, Brandeis, Steinhausen, & 
Drechsler, 2010).  As a result, individuals with ADHD require a greater magnitude of separation 
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between two temporal parameters when comparing if they are the same or not, relative to 
individuals not diagnosed with ADHD (Yang, Chan, Zou, Jing, Mai, & Li, 2007).  That said, 
another suggested hypothesis is that individuals with ADHD do not have trouble perceiving 
differences in time, rather they fail to successfully use temporal information when making time 
related decisions (Radonovich & Mostofsky, 2004).  The VExCP could provide a methodology 
that could help determine the basis for the link between ADHD and impaired temporal 
judgements.   
As previously stated, there are two hypotheses that have been suggested as to why 
individuals diagnosed with ADHD are impaired when making time judgements.  One hypothesis 
suggests individuals diagnosed with ADHD have trouble discriminating (thus, perceiving) the 
temporal parameters of events, whereas the second hypothesis suggests individuals diagnosed 
with ADHD do not have an impairment in perceiving the temporal parameter of events, but 
rather have difficulty using temporal information when making time related decisions.  A study 
using the VExCP as its methodology could be designed to help determine which hypothesis is 
more accurate when explaining the basis for individuals diagnosed with ADHD.  The proposed 
study would consist of two populations of individuals that are either diagnosed with or without 
ADHD.  The goal of the experiment would be to isolate an effect that one of the two hypotheses 
would predict, while controlling for the other effects predicted by the other hypothesis.  
The proposed study would be designed to isolate for the hypothesis that individuals 
diagnosed with ADHD have difficulty using temporal information when making temporal 
judgments, while accounting for the hypothesis that individuals diagnosed with ADHD have 
difficulty perceiving differences in the temporal parameter of events.  This experiment would 
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involve participants having to complete a VExCP task similar to the one used in the current 
study.  If the temporal parameters of the cues can be discriminated then participants should be 
able to anticipate the location of the target stimuli above chance performance when there is a 
predictable cue duration–target location relation, as in the predictable condition.  If individuals 
diagnosed with ADHD have difficulty using temporal information when making time 
judgements, then these individuals should make correct anticipations at a rate less than the group 
of individuals not diagnosed with ADHD and, quite likely, anticipate at chance performance.  
The important part of this task, therefore, is to ensure that the temporal parameters of the cues 
are large enough for individuals diagnosed with ADHD to be able to detect a difference.  Not 
only can tasks using the VExCP provide a means of examining the basis for why individuals 
diagnosed with ADHD have impaired temporal judgements, but can also be used to measure the 
presence of ADHD in young children. 
Young children diagnosed with ADHD have been also observed to have impairment 
when discriminating temporal events on the scale of hundreds of milliseconds (Marx, Hübner, 
Herpertz, Berger, Reuter, Kircher, Herpertz-Dahlmann, & Konrad, 2010).  As there is evidence 
to suggest ADHD is conferred genetically (Rhee, Waldman, Hay, & Levy, 1999; Sherman, 
Iacono, & McGue, 1997), parents may want to have their child examined for their risk of having 
ADHD as soon as possible.  Since young children are typically assessed for ADHD through 
clinical evaluation (Pappas, 2006), it may be beneficial to have a behavioural measure that can 
be done to screen individuals suspected for having ADHD as well.  Tasks that use the VExCP 
might be able to serve as an early behavioural assessment for children that are pre-verbal and do 
not possess fine motor control of their fingers, as their capacity to process temporal parameters 
and make time related decisions can be assessed.  Being able to have a behavioural assessment 
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that can potentially indicate an increased risk for ADHD in young children may lead to better 
and earlier diagnosis, and earlier intervention resulting in better education and preparation of 
these children for the years ahead of having to live with this disorder.        
Future Directions:  Temporal Bisection 
The results from the current study also offer potential new means by which researchers 
could investigate the performance of infants in temporal bisection tasks.  Being able to devise a 
temporal bisection task that can be used to measure performances in adults, children, and infants 
could provide direct comparisons across all age groups.  Being able to compare the performance 
across the developmental timeline will provide information as to how the capacity to process 
time—particularly, how temporal parameters are distinguished from one another and 
categorized—typically develops.  By gaining a greater understanding for how this temporal 
capacity develops, researchers will be able to have better information as to when and how 
individuals with an atypical temporal capacity delineate from typical, healthy development.   
As mentioned earlier, the temporal bisection tasks were tasks that required participants to 
discriminate events’ temporal parameters by means of pressing buttons.  While button presses 
are a viable means of response for adults and young children, they are not for infants.  The 
VExCP can be used as a means of assessing infants’ performance on a temporal bisection task, 
without the requirement of a button press.  An example of a possible bisection experimental 
design for infants with the VExCP could be one in which 6-month-old infants complete a task 
very similar to Experiment 1 in the current study in which a predictable cue duration–target 
location relation is established using two distinct standard durations (e.g., 700 and 1200 
milliseconds).  After a sufficient amount of trials to insure that the predictable relations have 
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been learned, a cue can be presented for a duration that is not one of the standards, but one of 
intermittent length (e.g., 800, 900, 1000, or 1100 milliseconds).  This creates a two-alternative 
forced choice test for the infant and which side they anticipate after viewing one of the 
intermittent cues is displayed indicates which standard duration infants perceive the intermittent 
cue to be most like.  By forcing the infant to make a dichotomous choice of choosing the left or 
right side is precisely the hallmark of temporal bisection tasks.  Across many participants, the 
experimenter can plot the percentage of anticipations to the side of the long standard duration 
(i.e., 1200 milliseconds) as a function of the duration of the cue that was previously displayed.  
Ideally, the graph would reveal a sigmoid curve as percentage of correct anticipations will 
increase as the duration of the cue increases.  The steepness of the graph will allow researchers to 
not only compare the performance of 6-month-old infants to young children and adults on a 
temporal bisection task, but will allow researchers to examine how sensitive the decision making 
process of 6-month-old infants is when discriminating temporal events on the scale of hundreds 
of milliseconds from one another.   
Conclusion 
 The purpose of the present study was to investigate whether infants have the capacity to 
process time information and use such information when interacting within their environment by 
forming expectations for temporally predictable events.  The capacity to perceive time is 
important because it is a skill necessary for the functioning of many cognitive processes.  As 
infants develop, so must their understanding of their complex environment.  By being able to 
process temporal information and then moderate their behaviour so they can act upon such 
information, allows them to predict and prepare for temporally predictable events.  The current 
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study investigated this as a speculative developmental transition point was discovered between 3 
and 6 months of age where 6-month-old infants possessed the capacity to detect and discriminate 
temporal events on the scale on hundreds of milliseconds and then use this information when 
formulating expectations and making anticipations to temporally predictable events.  By studying 
infant time perception with a methodology that can be used for adult and children studies, future 
research can be devoted to better understanding the development of the capacity to process time 
across the lifespan.  Being able to understand how the capacity to process temporal information 
develops in the typical, healthy individual will allow researchers to better understand when and 
why certain groups of individuals possess an atypical capacity for temporal processing.   
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Appendix 
Table 1  
Mean Responses made by the 6-Month-Old Infants from Experiment 1 
 Predictable Condition Unpredictable Condition 
 M SE M SE 
Total Anticipation (%)     
       Cue Duration     
             700 msec 30.63 3.67 40.64 4.82 
             1200 msec 44.92 5.91 44.16 4.48 
     
Correct Anticipation (%)     
       Cue Duration     
             700 msec 69.44 6.76 40.63 6.50 
             1200 msec 71.46 8.28 55.48 5.67 
     
Reactive Latencies (msec)     
       Cue Duration     
             700 msec 335.38 27.42 377.88 37.73 
             1200 msec 281.25 16.40 358.42 39.16 
Note. M = Mean. SE = Standard Error.   
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Table 2  
Mean Responses made by the 3-Month-Old Infants from Experiment 2 
 Predictable Condition Unpredictable Condition 
 M SE M SE 
Total Anticipation (%)     
       Cue Duration     
             700 msec 40.84 6.06 35.66 4.49 
             1200 msec 43.17 7.44 41.90 4.69 
     
Correct Anticipation (%)     
       Cue Duration     
             700 msec 55.99 10.52 52.78 10.67 
             1200 msec 62.65 9.51 44.44 5.26 
     
Reactive Latencies (msec)     
       Cue Duration     
             700 msec 427.71 46.61 469.46 32.11 
             1200 msec 411.79 36.73 472.17 28.57 
Note. M = Mean. SE = Standard Error.   
 
 
